The Party
by Richard McGregor
By Brett
Warnke
When my friend Jen Jen drove me past Beijing’s Tiananmen Square I
was unsure where we were going. She was a college friend but also a
“princeling,” one of the Party’s privileged elite. In New England, there
is “old money,” and in China there is “old Party.” Her grandfather, Hua
Guofeng, had been Mao’s immediate and short-lived successor (1976-1980). What
couldn’t Jen Jen get away with, I thought, when her grandpa was once called
“Chairman Hua”? She drove her sleek Honda into Zhongnanhai—a central and
secretive Party leadership compound near the Forbidden City. The walls
were high and guarded and the homes were gray but elegant. I clearly
remember a sentinel with an assault weapon standing outside her home. Jen
Jen dismissively told him I was a friend as she ran inside to get a scarf. He
flashed a light my way, leering at me like a hungry owl. How long, I
thought, would Party members in Zhongnanhai hold sway with soldiers like this
and thus, control China’s monopoly of violence? Would this Central Guard,
issued to all internal Party members, support the Politburo leaders until the
end or would he, like the forces in the Shah’s SAVAK, the Tsar’s Okhrana,
Honecker’s Stasi, disappear into the crowd upon the regime’s collapse?
The longevity and resourcefulness of the Communist Party is the
subject of “The Party,” Financial Times journalist
Richard McGregor’s revealing new book about China’s shadowy leadership. McGregor
warns us in the prologue that the book “has no pretence to being comprehensive
or definitive.” Yet, the scale and interest of McGregor’s interviews—most
interestingly with progressive activists—as well as the many secrets he reveals
about the Party’s self-serving maneuvers, tactics, and actions, renders this an
important book.
To
MacGregor the Party is a “colossus”, a “secretive hulk”, a “grand puppeteer”, a
“Board of Directors”, a “panapticon”, a “consensus,” a “sinuous, cynical and
adaptive beast.” It is an unelected cabal of apparatchicks as
secretive as the Vatican who operate in unmarked buildings, speak
on red Party-only phones, and live along a political knife-edge.
To outsiders the Party seems a gray, stony fixture of Chinese
society. But MacGregor reveals—like David Shambaugh’s Atrophy and
Adaptability—the struggles of the world’s most insecure leadership. The
Party dips its toes into every sector of society and culture to maintain its
relevance. “You call it interference,” an official tells McGregor, “We
call it leadership.” But its Leninist leadership—corrupt, authoritarian,
nepotistic, inefficient, extra-legal, and top-heavy.
The
thirty years of opening markets, initiated by the wily reformer Deng Xiaoping,
has sustained the Party and doubled China’s economy every eight years. But
Deng also led the 1989 crackdown in Tiananmen. MacGregor falls short in
explaining the reasons for the brutal backlash. He doesn’t even mention
Chairman Liu Shaoqi, whom Mao jailed and essentially killed during the Cultural
Revolution. Mao and the history of his radicalism were a dagger pointed at
reformers throats. The history of the Great Helsman’s mid-century
convulsions—which MacGregor deftly details—as well as the
state-socialist failure of the USSR showed how far China could devolve and how
weak the Party could be. Never again, seems the unspoken Party slogan.
(Appeared
in Providence Journal on Aug. 27, 2010)
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